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Abstract
The traditional delivery information system does not oﬀer anonymous property, which cannot provide protection to the individual
information between the shipping and receiving of information transmission such as recipient’s name, phone number, address,
material contents and so on. This is a big challenge to personal information of privacy and protection. In this paper, we will use
the blind signature to implant delivery information system which oﬀers anonymity under the delivery task, and guarantees the
consignee’s privacy to be protected.
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1. Introduction
With the development of electronic commerce, delivery gradually creeps into our life. At the same time, we should
take the issue of purchase privacy into consideration. How shall we protect sensitive individual data? It is a main
goal in this contribution. Wei and Li1 proposed an information protection application based on K-anonymity in 2014.
In the same year, Shi et al. 2 also proposed another improvement version under the k-anonymity scheme. In this
article, we will use the blind signature3 to implant delivery information system which can be easily understood and
implemented. Our ideas modified from Liao’s scheme4 and simplified by enhanced version5. Section 2 analyzes the
modeling of delivery environment, section 3 is our methodology, and the conclusion draws in final section.
2. Analysis of Current Modelling
Wei proposed two schemes in her master thesis6 is based on K-anonymity1, and the other one is based on RSA7 to
express information privacy protection. However, Wei just mentioned the business flow between delivery distribution
center and consignee. The courier’s quality is mixed good and bad to each express company in China. Thus, it is the
mainly problem to be solved how to protect the personnel information in this flow. But Wei does not consider the
other vulnerability that the message is leaked since the parcel transferred from company to distribution center. Any
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couriers can see consignee’s information by the delivery form. So it is a fundamental issue to hide the information of
delivery form. In this section we introduce two models. There are two players and three players; namely two parties
(bipartite) and three parties (tripartite).
2.1. The Two Parties Modelling
In Figure 1, there are two players, say buyer and seller. We suppose the buyer is not insider to leak his individual
information (steal what is entrusted to one’s care), the transaction describe as below:
Step 1. Customer books item and pays for shop.
Step 2. Merchant receives payment from customer, and deliveries item.
Customer (Purchaser)
1. Ordered and Paid
2. Received and Delivery
Shop (Merchant)
Fig. 1. The role of two parties
2.2. The three parties modelling
Step 1. Customer books item.
Step 2. Shop confirmed the order.
Step 3. Customer pays for shop.
Step 4. The shop notifies the consigner to prepare parcel.
Step 5. The express company send the parcel to recipient.
Step 6. Customer reply the received confirmation to shop.
Customer (Purchaser)
1. Ordered
4. Notify the consigner
Shops (Merchant)2. Conﬁrmed the order
3. Paid
6. Delivery conﬁrmation
5. Delivery
Express company
Fig. 2. The role of three parties
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2.3. Security Discussion
To two or three parties modeling, there exists a vulnerability that buyer’s information is unprotected. In Figure 1,
the seller might intentionally or unintentionally leak the buyer’s data. We focus on this intrinsic problem in the article.
There may be two vulnerabilities in Figure 2. The first one is merchant who leaks the purchaser’s data. The logistics
company may leak data when the parcel is transmitted from the origin to the destination, most data are unprotected
and directly shown on delivery form; the individual data can be easily captured. That is why we consider the express
company another latency. A fundamental information of delivery form, includes customer’s name, serial number
Table 1. The delivery original form of recipient’s information
Recipient Name Serial Number Phone Number Address Contents
Yu ZHANG 752114174732 18850899562 Guangdong Huizhou mobile
Zun WU 592750081239 15767975236 Fujian Xiamen candies
Mei WANG 571130201368 13745263201 Zhengjiang Hangzhou cosmetic
Ling LIN 551221407143 15765241652 Anhui Hefei shoes
(delivery order number), recipient’s phone number, cargo destination and the parcel contents. The result is as shown
in Table 1. In the real world, merchant use common method such as “partial-masked” to protect sensitive personal
information, some parts of data are masked or unmasked portion of that information which can be used in the selection
of delivery form. The sample is shown in Table 2. The recipient name and the phone number do not show on the
form, parts of message have been masked. Thus, anybody is diﬃcult to capture any useful data, we say at least in this
situation.
Table 2. The delivery masked form of recipient’s information
Recipient Name Serial Number Phone Number Address Contents
* ZHANG 752114174732 1885 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗562 Guangdong Huizhou iPhone 5S
* WU 592750081239 1576 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗236 Fujian Xiamen candies
* WANG 571130201368 1374 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗201 Zhengjiang Hangzhou cosmetic
* LIN 551221407143 1576 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗652 Anhui Hefei shoes
3. Our Methodology and Scheme
In this section we expect the sensitive data from partial to anonymity. The attacker is diﬃcult to find any relation-
ship from partial information. That is primary reason that we modified the blind signature scheme4 to be our system.
There are five phases: initializing, blinding, signing, unblinding and verification. We describe these phases as follows:
Notations:
RN: express the recipient’s name.
S N: express the serial number, namely the order number of delivery.
PN: express the recipient’s mobile phone number.
Add: express the cargo destination, it often express recipient’s address.
PC: express the parcel contents.
T ID: purchaser buy something from shop and generate an order number, it connected purchaser and merchant, say
transaction identify (TID).
‖: denotes concatenation which two variables or string be connected with end to end.
3.1. Initializing Phase
The purchaser randomly chooses two large primes p and q (where p or q over 1024 bits length), and calculates
n = p · q. (1)
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He then also chooses two large integers e1 and d1 to find
e1 · d1 ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)), (2)
where
φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1) (3)
such that
gcd(e1, φ(n)) = 1. (4)
The key pair (e1, n) is public key of purchaser, and d1 is purchaser’s secret key. Purchaser must keep the parameters
(p, q, d1) and publishes (e1, n), but share the φ(n) with merchant. The system preprocessing based on famous RSA
cryptosystem8. He also announces an one-way hash function, say h(.).
3.2. Blinding Phase
The shop has a recipient’s name RN, and wants it to be signed by the purchaser. The shop also chooses two large
integers e2 and d2 to find
e2 · d2 ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)), (5)
and randomly selects an integer r as the blinding factor, an anonymous identity T IDi. He computes
Ci ≡ h(T IDi‖RN)(1−e22) (mod n),
α ≡ r(e1d2) · h(T IDi‖RN) (mod n), (6)
The merchant keeps his private key d2 and publish the public keys e2, he then sends Ci and α to the purchaser.
Purchaser Merchant
Compute:TIDi, RN
Ci, α
TIDi, RN
Ci ≡ h(TIDi‖RN)
1−e2
2 (mod n)
Express Company
α ≡ r(e1d2) · h(TIDi‖RN) (mod n)
Send:
Fig. 3. The blinding phase
3.3. Signing Phase
The purchaser received Ci and α from merchant, he computes
t ≡ αd1e2 (mod n), (7)
and feedback t to merchant.
Purchaser Merchant
Compute:TIDi, RN
Ci, α
TIDi, RN
Ci ≡ h(TIDi‖RN)
1−e2
2 (mod n)
Express Company
α ≡ r(e1d2) · h(TIDi‖RN) (mod n)
t
t ≡ αd1e2
Send:
Fig. 4. The signing phase
3.4. Unblinding Phase
Upon receiving t, the merchant computes
s ≡ t · r−1 (mod n), (8)
and sends parameter s to express company. The express company also computes S N ≡ se1e2 · Ci (mod n), and sends
to purchaser.
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Purchaser Merchant
Compute:TIDi, RN
Ci, α
TIDi, RN
Ci ≡ h(TIDi‖RN)
1−e2
2 (mod n)
Express Company
α ≡ r(e1d2) · h(TIDi‖RN) (mod n)
t
t ≡ αd1e2
Send:
s ≡ t · r−1 s, Ci
Fig. 5. The unblinding phase
3.5. Verification Phase
Purchaser (or anyone) can verify the validation of the signature for the message h(T IDi‖RN) by checking if
se1e2 · Ci ≡ h(T IDi‖RN) (mod n). (9)
If verified successfully, the purchaser or merchant are legal user. Otherwise, one of them is an illegal user at least.
Purchaser Merchant
Compute:TIDi, RN
Ci, α
TIDi, RN
Ci ≡ h(TIDi‖RN)
1−e2
2 (mod n)
Express Company
α ≡ r(e1d2) · h(TIDi‖RN) (mod n)
t
t ≡ αd1e2
Send:
s ≡ t · r−1 s, Ci
Compute:
SN ≡ se1e2 · Ci
SN
Check:
SN
?
≡ h(TIDi‖RN) (mod n)
Fig. 6. The verification phase
Proof.
se1e2 ·Ci
?
≡ h(T IDi‖RN) (mod n).
≡ (t · r−1)e1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ (αd1e2 · r−1)e1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ [(re1d2 · h(T IDi‖RN))d1e2 · r−1]e1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ [re1d2d1e2 · h(T IDi‖RN)d1e2 · r−1]e1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ [r1 · h(T IDi‖RN)d1e2 · r−1]e1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ re1e2 · h(T IDi‖RN)d1e2e1e2 · re1e2 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ h(T IDi‖RN)e22 ·Ci (mod n).
≡ h(T IDi‖RN)e22 · h(T IDi‖RN)(1−e22) (mod n).
≡ h(T IDi‖RN) (mod n). (10)
The detailed scheme shows on Figure 7.
3.6. Security Analysis
The purchase’s individual information is anonymous which the system using one-way hash function9, this function
has some properties:
Pre-image resistance: Giving a value Ci, it is very diﬃcult to find the value h(T IDi‖RN)(1−e22) such that
Ci ≡ h(T IDi‖RN)(1−e22). (11)
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Customer (Purchaser)
1. TIDi, RN
4. s ≡ t · r−1, Ci
Shop (Merchant)
2. Ci, α
3. t
6. Announce Delivery conﬁrmation
5. S(e1e2) · Ci
Express company
Fig. 7. The anonymous delivery system based on blind signature scheme.
Collision resistance: Giving two values C1 and C2, it is very diﬃcult to match
h(C1) ≡ h(C2) (mod n), (12)
where
C1  C2. (13)
From above, anybody is diﬃcult to trace the purchaser’s information actually. Thus, the purchaser is anonymity on
this system.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed this scheme to support purchaser who would buy something from shop, the purchaser
does not worry to leak any individual information by public environment. Even if some parts of data are masked
from delivery form, we can not guarantee the attacker find a relationship between partial useful message. Hence, it
is necessary to process to full information. All of consignee’s information on delivery form are preprocessed, any
identifier is anonymous. In our scheme, we prevent two vulnerabilities: 1) The consignor or merchant leaks the
information. 2) The express company or courier leaks the information. Thus, our scheme is more useful and practical
secure for consumer.
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